Beneath the “Zunami”: Jacob Zuma and the Gendered Politics of Social Reproduction in South Africa

Mark Hunter
Department of Geography, University of Toronto at Scarborough, Ontario, Canada
School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa;
mhunter@utsc.utoronto.ca

Abstract: In April 2009, African National Congress leader Jacob Zuma was swept into power in South Africa’s fourth democratic general election. To date, this political “Zunami” has largely been presented as either a leftist rebellion against Mbeki’s neoliberalism, a reassertion of patriarchal “traditionalism”, or an example of Zulu ethnic mobilization. This article draws on a long-term ethnographic study to provide a critical gendered perspective on Zuma’s rise. It argues that Zuma resonates with many poor South Africans, including women, in part because of his ability to connect the personal and political in ways that talk to South Africa’s “crisis of social reproduction”. A key point the article emphasizes—one virtually absent from contemporary discussions about Zuma—is the profound gendering of growing class divisions, specifically the way this manifests itself in huge reductions in marital rates and heightened gendered contestations.

Keywords: gender, Gramsci, Jacob Zuma, social reproduction, South Africa

He sings, he dances, he sometimes says and does things that cause the chattering classes to cringe . . . Yet ANC president Jacob Zuma is, arguably, the most popular South African politician since Nelson Mandela. Why did aged women supporters burn pictures of his rape accuser outside the Johannesburg High Court during his trial? Why does that suggestive roll of the hips which precedes his battle-song, Umshini Wami, send young girls into a froth? And how did he come to be the saviour of the rural poor, the uneducated youth and the aspirant black middle-classes? (Tolsi 2009)

South Africa’s fourth democratic election on 22 April 2009 resulted in a “Zunami”, as it was widely called, whereby African National Congress (ANC) leader Jacob Zuma won 66% of the vote. What accounts for Jacob Zuma’s recent political ascendency, reflected not only in the election result but in his 2007 defeat of President Thabo Mbeki for the leadership of the ANC?
One explanation for Zuma’s popularity stands above all others: it represents a left-wing rebellion against Mbeki’s neoliberal economic policies and autocratic leadership style. Certainly, Zuma was enthusiastically promoted by the ANC’s two left-leaning partners in the “tripartite alliance”—COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) and the SACP (South African Communist Party). I will return later to this point which clearly has much merit.

Another common explanation viewed Zuma’s Zulu traditionalism as signaling a resurgence of patriarchal values, one at odds with the country’s new liberal democracy—Zuma famously dressed in animal skins for Zulu ceremonies and had multiple wives. From this perspective, Zuma represented all that is wrong with gender in South Africa, a backward polygamist out of step with the modern post-apartheid constitution. Being charged with (but acquitted of) rape in 2006 strengthened this criticism of him.¹

Yet these accounts leave other questions unaddressed. First, why did many women across the country throw themselves enthusiastically behind this self-proclaimed patriarch, a trend picked up even before the election?² Second, why did young voters, many of whom have never worked in any kind of secure union job, flock to register and vote for Zuma in contrast to their growing apathy in elections after 1994?³ Finally, to address another widely circulating theme, how did Zuma manage to win so much support outside of his heartland of KwaZulu-Natal, despite claims that his strong Zulu identity would alienate those identifying with other ethnicities?

To explore these questions, I draw on feminist Marxist work on social reproduction and consider the simultaneously gendered/classed nature of popular disillusionment with the Mbeki era. In this journal and elsewhere Hart (2007, 2008) has employed a Gramscian frame to argue that Zuma’s political ascendancy derives from his ability to articulate multiple meanings into a complex unity centered on the nation. Here, I give attention to the historical making of gendered experiences and practices—in Gramscian terms “common sense”—with which Zuma resonates.

The arguments presented in this paper must be seen as provocative and provisional. Data on the election are limited: in-depth surveys of election trends by class, region, race, gender, etc, that are common in the US and other parts of the West, are rare in South Africa. Another point to state upfront is that this article does not emerge from a research project addressing Zuma himself but an historical ethnography of gender and AIDS. I believe, however, that grounding discussions of Zuma in the political economy of gender and intimacy provides important insights. The article proceeds by setting out how the concept of social reproduction, while somewhat unspecific, allows me to bring together a set of processes relevant to understanding Zuma’s popularity today:
colonialism/capitalism that resulted not only in wage labor but the preservation of key aspects of pre-capitalist society; the rise of the apartheid state that sought to promote racial rule by refashioning certain forms of patriarchy; the development of a broadly neoliberal post-apartheid state that championed a technocratic form of “development”; and a dramatic reduction in marital rates that helped to foster heightened gender contradictions. I chart the most recent of these changes by drawing on an historical ethnography of one place, Mandeni, KwaZulu-Natal.

My central argument is that one reason why Zuma resonates with many poor South Africans is his ability to connect the personal and political in ways that talk to what some call South Africa’s “crisis of social reproduction” (Bezuidenhout and Fakier 2006; Fakier and Cock 2009; Von Holdt and Webster 2005). The post-apartheid state’s embrace of the market and capital’s greater mobility and flexibility, as these writings show, shift social burdens onto women. Yet, while this approach places important emphasis on the household, a key point I emphasize is the profound importance of huge reductions in marital rates and heightened gendered contestations to South Africans’ everyday lives. Indeed, I argue that scholars’ failure to adequately understand the Zunami, especially women’s support for Zuma, demands an analysis that draws connections between personal lives, national policy, and neoliberal capitalism. More broadly, by showing how class is lived in a gendered way (and gender lived in a classed way) I hope to demonstrate how a detailed historical ethnography of intimacy might contribute to studies of social reproduction and political change in other social settings.

To date, a long line of feminist work has taken social reproduction beyond its classic Marxist lineage that emphasized the reproduction of capitalism and specifically labor power (Bakker and Silvey 2008; Bezanson 2006; Bezuidenhout and Fakier 2006; Katz 2001; for a review see Laslett and Brenner 1989). If the boundaries between production and social reproduction are blurry (for instance Mitchell et al 2003), feminist studies have importantly forefronted the gendered processes by which workers and children survive and are reproduced. Since the institutional context for this varies over time and space, we must consider the specific historical-geography of social reproduction in South Africa. I sketch out some introductory points below, especially drawing attention to matters of intimacy that remain pertinent today.

The region in which this study is based, KwaZulu-Natal, became a British colony in the nineteenth century. Before the arrival of white settlers the pivotal economic and social institution in this agrarian society was the rural homestead led by a married man. As Marxist scholars note, key to this labor-intensive economy was women’s prominent role in agriculture and as childbearers; this was consistent with
certain controls on women, especially around matters of fertility (Guy 1987). Indeed, central to the organization of pre-capitalist societies, as Meillassoux (1972) famously argued, was not the control of production but reproduction. Although this is a somewhat general picture, in the KwaZulu-Natal area ilobolo (bridewealth) was certainly closely connected to women’s fertility—notably a family could ask for its return if a bride was infertile. This gift, usually of cattle to a bride’s father, held enormous economic and symbolic importance in society.

This history is significant because the form of colonialism/capitalism that transformed the region did not immediately proletarianize South Africans but structured society in different (gendered) ways. Heavily outnumbered, British settlers in Natal pioneered “indirect rule”, a form of governance that devolved day-to-day power to “traditional” institutions such as chiefs. In turn, as Wolpe (1972) argued, the profitability of the male migrant labor system, pioneered by the mining industry, rested on the preservation of some rural land occupied on a day-to-day basis by women, children, and the elderly in “reserves”. As Wolpe (1972:435) noted: “The extended family in the Reserves is able to, and does, fulfil ‘social security’ functions necessary for the reproduction of the migrant work force”. South Africa’s racialized capitalism, in short, was built on an arrangement whereby men toiled in the gold or diamond mines whereas wives engaged in social reproduction in geographically separate rural areas.

Over time, rural areas’ agricultural capacity waned and the central institution of daily life, the marital homestead, moved from a surplus producing unit to one that became dependent on wage labor. Meanwhile, secondary industry grew in urban areas and this necessitated a more stable urban workforce. In line with these developments, many black “African” South Africans moved to towns and the post-1948 apartheid state itself developed a substantial urban housing program that, as we shall see, promoted the heterosexual family, albeit in a highly contradictory way.

Yet as a sign of how this past structured affective and material worlds, ilobolo persisted in both rural and urban areas, although becoming wholly dependent on wage labor. Codified into customary law by Natal’s settlers in the nineteenth century (although not instituted in such a formal way elsewhere in the country), ilobolo payments of usually 11 cattle became upheld by “traditional” institutions that indirect rule established—and the apartheid (post-1948) period strengthened.

Today ilobolo is a substantial payment usually given in cash and amounting to several thousand US dollars. Although ilobolo is paid to a bride’s father, women became among the greatest defenders of the payment since it signified a man’s ability to support, and love, a wife in an era of wage labor and apartheid-related insecurities (Hunter 2010). Yet, as I show in more detail below, the dependence of marriage on
men’s labor meant that the rise of chronic unemployment created a generation of men and women who remain predominantly unmarried. This yielded far-reaching changes to all aspects of everyday life, from where people live to their intimate relations. These dynamics have yet to be adequately considered in either analyses of social reproduction or studies of Zuma’s rise.

Research Site: Mandeni, KwaZulu-Natal
My research site, Mandeni, about which I provide more details later, is located some 100 kilometers north-east of Durban on South Africa’s east coast (see map). It comprises a large conglomeration of factories surrounded by an informal settlement, rural land, and several formal urban areas. I have been conducting research in Mandeni since 2000; my own contradictory social location cannot be dealt with adequately here (but see Hunter 2010). In brief, the study is an historical ethnography of intimacy in an area where perhaps one in two people are HIV positive. The largest period of research was conducted from 2002 to 2005, and the last stay took place in 2006 and coincided with Zuma’s rape trial; further visits were undertaken in 2007 and 2009. I (a white man) lived with a family in Isithebe informal settlement while conducting research. Nearly all the interviews were conducted in isiZulu at informants’ homes and translated by the author, occasionally with some help on certain passages. A research assistant was present and assisted during most interviews.

To reflect the way that colonial/apartheid policies differentiated South Africans it is necessary to use prevailing categories on “race” (Africans, Indians, whites, and coloreds). The aim is not to reify constructions of race or downplay connections between different South Africans. Neither do I want to naturalize the underlying racialization of party politics: that the vast majority of “Africans” support the ANC and whites the opposition is because of the country’s racialized history and not any innate social ties. The recent election did show a slight realignment of this position with the Congress of the People (COPE), a black-led offshoot from the ANC, winning 7% of total support. Still, few doubted that the ANC would win the 2009 election—if the scale of the Zunami, the focus of this paper, surprised many.

The Zunami: Some Popular Interpretations
None of the prevailing explanations of Zuma’s popularity or the points I put forward are mutually exclusive. But one particular theme that runs through my analysis is the need to go beyond portrayals of Zuma as simply a backward patriarch—a view implying that women’s support for Zuma is some kind of “false consciousness”. I need to make clear at this point that I am not arguing that there is an authentic “African” perspective that can simply replace a “Western” or “liberal”
understanding of Zuma (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2001 for a critique of these binaries in respect of notions of personhood). Liberalism has a long history among black South Africans, beginning with a small mission-educated elite but becoming immensely influential with the struggle for political and social “rights”. Indeed, precisely because subjectivities are produced in multiple discourses, institutions, and practices, there is no contradiction between an isiZulu-speaking woman simultaneously deriding Zuma’s backward sexism and yet supporting him for being a “traditional” respectable man. In fact, I know quite a lot of women who have expressed both views openly. My overarching approach then is to consider multiple reasons for Zuma’s rise as overlapping and, often, related.

To date, most accounts of Zuma’s rise within the ANC emphasize the pivotal role of three affiliated organizations: COSATU, the main union federation; the South African Communist Party; and the ANC Youth League. I am more concerned, however, with Zuma’s popularity among South Africans than with the organizations that actively promoted him as a leftist alternative to Mbeki. While these institutions yield influence within South Africa—and COSATU in particular has a large membership base (around two million people)—most of the 11-and-a-half million people who voted for Zuma are not directly associated with them. Indeed, an extraordinary social gap now exists between a
shrinking group of mostly male (and aging) core workers, unions’ main
collectivity, and the rest of the population.6

More relevant to the Zunami, as observers also point out, is
widespread disaffection, especially among the poor, with the Mbeki
Presidency (1999–2008). Growing up in rural Zululand and being
largely self-educated, Zuma is undoubtedly viewed by many South
Africans as having a down-to-earth and pro-poor persona. This provides
a sharp counterpoint to the formally educated but rather distant and
authoritarian Mbeki. Indeed growing class inequalities after 1994 are
manifest not only in the conspicuous consumption of a super-rich
class but in everyday cultural contestations. One reason, for instance,
why the largely self-educated Zuma resonates with poorer South
Africans is because he contrasts strongly with a group somewhat
derisorily called “amamodelC”—young African men and women who
gain middle-class prospects by studying at former white “model-C”
schools (described later). Zuma’s good but not perfect English (in
contrast to Mbeki’s educated persona, groomed by studying at Sussex
University) is symbolic of most black people’s poor schooling during
and after apartheid. Yet while growing class polarization is critical
to Zuma’s rise, I will show that this feeds into and from a series of
gendered meanings that can locate Zuma as more “respectable” than
Mbeki.

A third, again related, explanation for Zuma’s popularity—especially
his resonance with men—is his image as a “traditional” patriarch who
might roll back post-1994 legislation promoting gender equality. Few
South Africans with access to televisions can forget the horrific scenes of
angry Zuma supporters shouting “burn the bitch” outside his rape trial.
Living in Mandeni in April 2006 during the trial I chatted with many
isiZulu-speakers about Zuma (generally quite poor residents of Isithobe
informal settlement or Sundumbili township aged in their 20s and 30s).
Conversations were especially pertinent because the leader hailed from
Nkandla, a rural area only some 70 kilometers to the north-west. Not
all young men supported Zuma but his image as a man upholding the
gendered ordering of society struck a chord with many. This would
certainly support the argument that one constituency within Zuma’s
support base are men seeking a reassertion of “traditional” male power.
But again, as I show later, there is no absolute contradiction between his
image as a staunch patriarch and as a respectable man.

Questions around ethnicity also demand attention. Before the election
a common opinion rooted Zuma’s popularity in his Zuluness since
isiZulu is the most widely spoken home-language in South Africa. Yet
the election results dealt a blow to this view: Zuma did better in six out of
the other eight provinces than he did in his home province of KwaZulu-
Natal. This suggests that we need to think more about what ethnicity
means in a democratic era. A popular interpretation of ethnicity is one of

© 2011 The Author
Antipode © 2011 Editorial Board of Antipode.
ethnic subjects being formed in antagonistic relation to opposing groups; this is hardly surprising given violent struggles in the 1990s between the Zulu nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party and the anti-apartheid ANC. One question that arises, however, is whether Zuma’s “traditionalism” was partly understood, especially outside KwaZulu-Natal, not as Zulu chauvinism, as some predicted, but in the following terms: as a reaction to Mbeki’s apparent elitism; as a signifier of “the poor” in an era of rising class divisions; and as a sign of “family” and “kinship” at a time when an unprecedented number of people are unmarried. Much more can be said about ethnicity; my main point here is to suggest that it does not operate independently of the processes outlined in this article.

Mandeni in the 1960s: Industrial Man, his Wife, and his House

None of the accounts I flagged—Zuma’s institutional support, his class credentials, his image as a patriarch, or his embrace of Zuluness—on their own explain the Zunami. I seek to deepen this analysis. I touch later on Mandeni’s relevance to country-wide dynamics, but my aim here is to use the history of this place to capture in a very broad sense some quite fundamental shifts in the family, labor, and the state. The area now called Mandeni Municipality is centered on a company town, or more accurately two company towns, one black, one white. Located on the banks of the Thukela River, the SAPPI (South African Pulp and Paper Industries Limited) paper mill was established in 1954. As a consequence of the infamous Group Areas Act, whites lived south of SAPPI in a small suburban town called Mandini whereas Africans employees were forced to live north in the more densely populated Sundumbili township; a much smaller Indian and colored population was centered at Tugela and Mangete respectively.

I give attention here to Sundumbili township, the formal urban area built for those designated as “African”. Townships became virtually the only place where a growing African labor force could live in urban areas as more than temporary workers. Mostly built in the 1950s and 1960s, they drew from modernist American and British planning practices and incorporated designs that enabled state surveillance—for instance, wide roads (Parnell and Mabin 1995; Robinson 1996). Especially after the 1976 Soweto uprising, townships became famous sites for anti-apartheid struggles.

Yet townships were also part of a deeply gendered state project that has been inadequately documented. When it opened in 1964, Sundumbili’s most prominent structures were four-roomed township houses—dubbed “matchbox” houses—allocated to married men (on colonial policy and industrial man elsewhere in Africa see Cooper 2003). According to one influential advocate, the family houses were “capable of becoming a
home that promotes family life and the nurture of children” (Calderwood 1953:18; see also Posel 1991). If countless writings have stressed how dominant patterns of migrant labor divided families, townships signaled how apartheid policies also sought to promote the male-led home.

South Africans who moved from rural to urban areas constructed masculinities in new ways. On the one hand racial rule was violently emasculating: white men, women, and even children referred to African men as “boys”. But revealing of the continued importance men gave to heading a household, the emotive isiZulu word umnumzana came to mean “gentleman” in addition to its longstanding meaning “a rural head of household”. No longer simply evoking a successful rural patriarch, the word came to signify an educated, usually married, urban man. In the words of a powerful Zulu metaphor, men were “building a home” (ukwakha umuzi)—but an urban version of this project.

Masculinities therefore became forged in conditions of industrial growth and racism but this did not take place in any automatic or uncontested way. Long-term residents of Sundumbili told me how vigorous debates broke out over whether men should sever ties with rural areas and live permanently in the township or refuse the model of urban patriarchy and maintain a home in a rural area (perhaps living with a concubine in the township). This was rarely a simple decision: was a married men who lived with an urban concubine immoral because he lived “in sin” (a view preferred by Christians) or moral because he lived in this temporary arrangement precisely not to settle permanently and ukubhunguka (a powerful verb that means “for a man to abandon his rural home”)?

These questions became reframed in later decades. Sundumbili was located in what came in the 1970s to be called the homeland of KwaZulu. The homeland project, whereby most Africans were required to live in ethnically prescribed areas, was at the heart of the apartheid state’s attempt to divide black South Africans by promoting ethnic identification. It drew directly from the colonial era whereby pre-capitalist relations were partly preserved by forcing Africans into “reserves”.

From the 1970s, the KwaZulu homeland was run by Inkatha, a Zulu nationalist organization. The organization was founded in the 1920s but in the 1970s Mangosuthu Buthelezi reinvigorated it with initial support from the ANC. Later, in the 1980s and early 1990s, Inkatha would clash violently with the ANC. Yet, in the 1970s, most of the leaders of Inkatha in Mandeni saw themselves as respectable men and were employed at the SAPPI paper mill. Inkatha also enjoyed support from urban women, many of whom embraced a domesticated femininity centered on the nuclear family.

Despite tumultuous social change, then, marriage remained central to men and women’s urban identities—a key path to respectable
social adulthood. Although certain traditions were looked down on as uncouth in urban areas, one that persisted was ilobolo. Fathers had a material interest in securing ilobolo payments, but most daughters also strongly defended the custom: how else would a woman know that a man was serious about her and would be able to support her? Cash had to be earned, and this required commitment, sacrifice, and dedication to the project of “building a home”—all signs of a good man. Illobolo incorporated within it, therefore, profound meanings of male respectability at a time of brutal racial oppression.

**Life History 1: Mr Ngcobo**

The contours of racism and yet gendered paternalism that shaped past generations’ lives can be seen in the case of Mr Ngcobo. This man was born in 1942 and lives in an old part of Sundumbili township. Young and old residents today talk about him, like most of SAPPI’s early employees, as a man of status—one of the founding fathers of the township. He moved to Mandeni from a nearby rural area in 1966 when he found work at the SAPPI paper mill. In 1968, four years after starting to pay ilobolo, he eventually married his childhood girlfriend and they moved into the four-roomed township house they still occupy.

Although wages rose after a strike in 1973, he says he left SAPPI in 1978 because of apartheid (white) foremen who “would kick like donkeys”. He started a panel-beating business in the township and also worked for a stint at the fast-growing factory complex near Isithebe Industrial Park. Like many other older residents he purchased his house cheaply in the 1980s—in his case for only R1680 (US $210). He now pays it off at R35 (US $4) a month, sharing it with his wife and two children.

Men’s urban status became inscribed in the spatialized routines of everyday life that visits to houses such as Mr Ngcobo’s quickly revealed. In Mr Ngcobo’s “matchbox” house his wife, when addressing me, referred to him as “Ubaba walayikhaya” (the father of the house). Moreover, immediately detectable was an aura surrounding the isihlalo sikababa (father’s chair), the most comfortable chair in the house. I often witnessed mischievous grandchildren scampering from these seats when ubaba entered the room.

As we sat down to talk, his wife and children quickly offered us drinks, a sign of respect to us but also to Mr Ngcobo. The small size of township houses made it difficult to uphold spatial divisions but some hlonipha practices (practices of respect) could be maintained—for instance, when a child or woman guqa-ed (kneeled) while serving food or drink to a man or older person. Overriding the household head’s power was the reality that the house was granted only to working men. And no better witness than Nelson Mandela (1994:98) describes the masculine feeling
of moving into a township house (in his case in Orlando in the 1940s): “it was the first true home of my own and I was mightily proud. A man is not a man until he has a house of his own . . .”.

1994–Present: Social Reproduction on a Shoestring
Many black South Africans were never part of the state’s highly contradictory practice of promoting the patriarchal family (and if we were exploring this in more detail we would have to differentiate between local, regional, and national state institutions). It is also misleading to position the apartheid/post-apartheid periods in neat binary terms. For this reason, I begin with trends rooted earlier before moving into the post-apartheid era.

After several decades of strong economic growth, the mid-1970s witnessed oil price hikes and heightened anti-apartheid struggles. This, along with vigorous international sanctions campaigns in the 1980s, resulted in an economic crisis that extended well into the 1990s. Different regions, of course, fared differently and in Mandeni unemployment was kept in check, at least at first, by the establishment of a giant factory complex, Isithebe Industrial Park, in 1971. But while these factories transformed Mandeni from a predominantly rural into an industrial area, growing country-wide unemployment caused an influx of people looking for work, pushing up the local unemployment rate.

Rising unemployment, in turn, overlapped with a growing housing crisis. Shaken by economic and political crisis, the state imposed a nationwide freeze on building township housing from the 1970s. Consequently, the township’s average population per formal house in Sundumbili rose from roughly 4:1 in 1969, to 7:1 in 1983, and to 12:1 in 1991 (Hunter 2010). For many young township residents, rented backyard shacks (*imijondolo*) became one of the only places in which they could live with a partner.

Soon after democratic elections in 1994 the ANC adopted a broadly neoliberal economic strategy that intensified class inequalities (Marais 2001). Although over time the state undertook some quite significant social interventions, especially in housing and social payments for the poor, it rested great faith in the market to overcome past injustices. Mandeni’s social geography changed in several ways broadly consistent with these trends. There was a quite dramatic movement of middle-class black South Africans (for instance, teachers and senior industrial workers) into the former suburbs previously reserved for whites. Where whole families did not move, young people were enrolled into new schools. In the Mandeni area, the previously all-white “model-C” school is perched in the leafy and spacious surroundings of Mandini (the former “white” town). Now three out of four of its students are African.
Second, the housing crisis deepened. One aspect of this is the continued growth of shacks both in the township and nearby informal/shack settlements. In the 1980s the rise of shacks signaled the ascendancy of a group of urban dwellers who had marginal access to work and township housing (Crankshaw 1993). After democratic elections, shack settlements continued to grow on the outskirts of Sundumbili, in the backyards of Sundumbili’s formal houses, and in Isithebe informal settlement. Fuelled partly by in-migration, this growing shack population occurred despite a significant number of local job losses. Unmarried women became a particularly large group who eked out a living in Mandeni’s shacks.

Housing policy, in fact, provides a very good example of the post-apartheid state’s technocratic approach to social reproduction—one driven by the overriding need to satisfy “development” targets and yet riddled with contradictions. As part of a large national house building project, the Mandeni Municipality did build around 1000 “RDP” houses at Hlomendlini. These types of houses took their name from the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), an interventionist framework replaced in 1996 by a broadly neoliberal plan called GEAR (Growth, Employment, and Redistribution).

However, unlike the four-room family houses built under apartheid, RDP houses are generally two-room residences; unlike the minimum living space of 51.2 square meters found in the “matchbox” houses, the minimum living area of RDP houses is 30 square meters. Moreover, houses are typically built on cheap land far from central urban areas. Hlomendlini, for instance, is located ten kilometers from most work opportunities in Mandeni (although the municipality has now started building some houses closer to central areas). RDP houses are not, in short, family houses and yet neither, often located miles from work opportunities, do they represent a discernable alternative vision of how the state should address questions of social reproduction.

In the Mandeni area, all of these changes were encompassed by quite dramatic shifts in the labor market fueled by cuts to industrial subsidies in the 1990s and then trade liberalization after 1994. When the post-apartheid government, keen to integrate with the global economy, joined the World Trade Organization in 1995, it was required to reduce trade tariffs; yet it went further than WTO rules stipulated in order to flaunt its free-market credentials to potential investors. In Isithebe Industrial Park, as a consequence, employment dropped from around 23,000 to 15,000 between 1990 and the mid-2000s and consequently unemployment in the area rose. By 2006, a nationwide study found that a staggering 72% of women and 58% of men between 15 and 24 years old were without formal work (Republic of South Africa 2006:18). And a terrible AIDS pandemic, whereby around 30% of women in antenatal clinics are HIV positive, both feeds from
and into growing inequalities and restructuring households (Hunter 2007).

In the sphere of social reproduction, as scholars note, growing unemployment pushes added burdens onto women. Yet it also serves to erode marital rates. The roots of plummeting marital rates are complex; they include (until recently) women’s increased work prospects and thus their growing economic independence from men. But particularly from the mid-1970s, men’s inability to secure ilobolo or act as dependable “providers” became additional brakes on marriage. Indeed, marriage in South Africa has faced perhaps one of the sharpest reductions in the world, with marital rates halving from the 1960s; wedlock is virtually a middle-class institution today. While some observers equate this reduction in marriage with a decline in morality, in reality it represents a complex reconfiguration of resources, residential geographies, emotional and sexual relations, and labor (formal, informal, and domestic) at a time of chronic unemployment. Importantly, it also yields heightened gender contestations as women deride men for their failure to marry them and men deride women for their new independence.

Life History 2: Dingane
Consider the case of a young man, Dingane, in comparison to Mr Ngcobo discussed earlier. In the 1960s, Mr Ngcobo married and attained a four-room township house that he subsequently bought cheaply. Facing physical violence in the apartheid workplace, he gained some control in his personal life. Dingane, in contrast, grew up in the era of freedom and liberal rights but is unemployed and unmarried. He lives in one of South Africa’s burgeoning informal settlements characterized by small imijondolo, poor roads, and woeful access to clean water.

I first met Dingane in 2000. Then a 13-year-old young man, one of the most vivid recollections I have from my research was seeing him one day standing outside a neighbor’s house peering longingly through the lounge window towards the television set. The well-to-do owners of the house, who owned a successful local business and rented out imijondolo, sent their children to model-C (former white) schools. While Dingane was welcome to play with the family’s children in the yard, he was not allowed to enter the house. Captured in his awkward squints at the television seemed to be the agonizing elusiveness of post-apartheid prosperity.

As the years went by, I noticed Dingane’s friends gain confidence through their privileged schooling and talk optimistically (in steadily improving English) about working in the media industry—a favorite dream of young, educated children. Dingane, however, slumped deeper into depression. One day he told me that he worked illegally for R5
(US $0.60) a day in a bread factory. Keen on schooling, Dingane told me he did not want to engage in the womanizing and drinking that he saw men in the area doing. He dreamed of working at SAPPI, the paper mill, the heart of the town—if only he could become educated.

However, when I returned to Mandeni in 2006 after a year’s absence, Dingane was in prison, having been caught stealing cell phones from residents. Aged 19 by this time, everyone said that he had changed; this was evident in his drinking and stealing. By 2009, my friends told me that he had acquired a gun and was involved in armed robberies in the area.

Dingane’s case is not uncommon. In Mandeni, so banal is crime that it barely reaches the level of gossip unless it is particularly violent or involves a well-known person. Left behind in a society that offers social mobility to only a selective few, one of the only ways up for many young men is through criminal activities.

How do young women approach men like Dingane? As we shall see, many will say that he is not a true man, he is not working, and unable to pay ilobolo to marry. As a petty criminal Dingane was not even a successful gangster who could quite easily attract girlfriends. One derogatory term that women use for men like Dingane is that they are isahluleki (literally a failure). This term used to be employed to describe a married man who failed to support his home. Now, it is used to criticize a man who cannot marry or support a woman.

Zuma: A Man of the People

In what ways might this shift from high employment and the patriarchal family to chronic unemployment and the virtual absence of marriage give context to Zuma’s popularity? How does this “crisis of social reproduction” play out not only in the spheres of employment/unemployment but in the domain of the intimate/personal? At a very basic level we can note that despite his pro-poor credentials Zuma is probably no more likely than Mbeki to try to challenge the structural underpinnings of class inequality in South Africa; indeed, in some respects, the intense battles between Zuma and Mbeki supporters were about which faction would capture the state and its opportunities for patronage—including “redeployment” into the lucrative business world.

At the same time, Zuma did promise change: before and after the general election he tried to establish himself as a no-nonsense leader who would now “deliver” to the masses. Notably, while jobs were part of his pledge, he gave greater emphasis to improving what is widely called in South Africa “service delivery”; this usually refers to housing, social benefits, and services like electricity. While these interventions have the ability to alter the country’s social-spatial structure, chronic unemployment and intensified class polarization limits their ability to do so in fundamental ways. At one level, then, when Zuma’s supporters
talk about class redistribution, they often mean “service delivery”, which is a somewhat technocratic project—and one, notably for the argument made here, aimed at the household and thus matters of social reproduction.

At a more detailed level, however, Zuma’s popularity talks to the profoundly gendered nature of growing class inequalities. One important consequence of rising unemployment is that age, class, and marriage are now very closely related in Mandeni, as in South Africa as a whole. It is typically older married men who are employed in permanent jobs in relatively high-paying sectors such as the metal industry. From the 1960s to the 1980s they often received subsidized state housing. In turn, in the 1980s, a generation of women found factory work in the area, many choosing not to marry. But most men and women coming of age, or arriving, in Mandeni in the 1990s found it difficult, or impossible, to find work and virtually none are married. There are millions of Dinganes today who are portrayed as failures by young women, and compared unfavorably with older men.

Indeed, many young men and women tend to live indefinitely in their family’s house, dependent on family members, or move into a tiny umjondolo (shack). Most young men I know say that they want to marry but cannot afford the ilobolo payment or the cost of setting up an independent home. While young women often say that they want greater marital equality than their mothers experienced, most say that they wish to marry.

One demasculinizing term that young men use to reflect on this life is umnqolo. An old definition of the term umnqolo is a rural man too scared to herd cattle. Today, one use of the word is to describe a man who still “lives with his mother”. In turn, for women, the once unusual, pitied figure of uzendazamshiya (“an unmarried [literally left] woman still living with her family”) has become nearly universal. Though in the past many employed women chose not to marry, chronic unemployment today means that they cannot even chart an alternative femininity based on work and economic independence.

That class is lived in a gendered way can be seen when the middle class (now black and white) flaunts its expensive weddings and large houses. These growing class differences can intensify gendered conflicts between young men and women and yet naturalize them as biologically based. At the heart of these gender tensions is a seismic disturbance to taken-for-granted gender meanings and yet the absence of firm new moorings—or at least by the presence of moorings that only appear accessible to a middle class after apartheid.

This heightened gender conflict, and its class dynamics, helps to explain why when I was living in Mandeni at the time of Zuma’s rape trial many women vigorously supported Zuma and celebrated his “traditional” views, including his polygamous marriages. Sure, he
is a philanderer, women said, but he provides material support for his wives, unlike young men who do not marry their girlfriends. It is worth returning briefly to the rape trial to understand these points better. Although the trial clearly demonstrates the entrenched nature of gender inequalities in the country, it can also be read against the grain in revealing ways.

The Zuma Rape Trial
In 2000, Zuma, then South Africa’s former Deputy President and 64 years old, was charged with rape by a woman half his age, a family friend and AIDS activist dubbed “Khwezi” (star) by her supporters. Zuma was found not guilty but the events surrounding the trial symbolized, for many, the distance that still needed to be traveled to ensure gender equality in the young democracy. As his supporters cheered in the streets, inside the courtroom Zuma fanned the volatile flames by flaunting his credentials as a Zulu traditionalist. He controversially drew on Zulu customs to authenticate his claim that he could acquire sex relatively easily and was therefore no rapist: “angisona isishimane mina”, he declared (I don’t struggle to have liaisons with women/I am not a sissy). He also argued that in Zulu culture a man who left a woman sexually aroused could himself be charged with rape. Zuma’s defense, in other words, was that he was no rapist, just a traditional patriarch with a large sexual appetite (on the rape trial see Ratele 2006; Robins 2008a).

Zuma’s stance, and the undoubted biases of the courts, led to great opposition from gender activists. They argued that Zuma, a man aspiring to be President, should be upholding rather than undermining the new constitution’s commitment to gender rights. The international and national press generally agreed: the South African Mail & Guardian, for instance, described Zuma’s attitudes towards women as “Neanderthal” (Robinson et al 2006:6).

Undoubtedly Zuma’s critics were reacting to the extremely high levels of rape in the country and the often ineffective nature of the judicial system. And the failures of liberal institutions together with Zuma’s controversial call on static Zulu “traditions” created a certain logic whereby discussions were framed through a dichotomy of “traditional patriarchy” versus “modern equality”. Nevertheless, the trial reflected much more than simply matters of sex or a titanic struggle between rights and tradition: it was, at another level, a meeting site for divergent meanings around gender and social reproduction.

Testifying in isiZulu, one Zulu metaphor that Zuma used in court and for which he was lambasted by the media was “isibaya sikababa wakhe” (father’s cattle kraal) to refer to a woman’s genitalia. Yet, contrary to the media’s reports, this is not simply a sexualized and derogatory term.
The phrase evokes the cattle that a father receives as *ilobolo* for his daughter’s marriage. It is given meaning today not simply because it signifies men’s unbridled control over women, as the *Mail & Guardian* newspaper suggested when it called Zuma “Neanderthal” for using it, but because it contrasts with crude words for a woman’s genitalia that see them in purely sexual terms. Many older people I spoke with during the course of my research used the phrase and compared it favorably with the brash contemporary youth culture out of which emerged songs with titles such as “*sika lehekhe*” (literally “cut the cake”, where *ikhekhe* is slang for a woman’s genitalia).11 Zuma’s metaphor for fertility, therefore, spoke rather ironically, given the context, to an era where society valued not simply sexual pleasure or sexual conquest but childbirth and kinship.

Consider too Zuma’s statement that he had offered to pay *ilobolo* to marry Khwezi after her accusations against him. The English-speaking press widely derided this announcement but the word *ilobolo* has such gravitas in isiZulu that the isiZulu press did not present Zuma’s comments in such negative terms.12 Indeed, to dismiss *ilobolo* as simply a patriarchal tradition or a sign of the commodification of relationships (ie a bribe) is to miss the way it marks respectability—even more so today because of the rarity of marriage among young, often unemployed, South Africans. *Illobolo* long connected work and family, house and home, production and reproduction. Zuma therefore drew on the high status of marriage and fertility to society to position himself as a respectable patriarch, an *umnumzana*, and not a rapist.

The 2009 Zunami

Three years later, in March 2009, when Zuma was poised to win the Presidency, I discussed the leader with Mandeni’s residents once more. With the help of a research assistant with whom I had worked since 2000 (a woman from the area now in her late 20s), I interviewed people who were not active supporters of any political party and asked them in a quite general sense about what people felt about Zuma. We spoke with 12 people in total, several of whom I knew from previous research in the area. This comprised two groups of three men and women in their early 20s, two informants in their late 40s interviewed together (one man and one woman), and four informants in their 50s and 60s (all men) interviewed separately.13 This is not a large sample but I would point out that the themes I raise are widely reflected in studies across the country. This includes the tremendous sense of conflict among young people, the sense that young men have let down young women, and women’s frequent preference for older boyfriends (for instance LeClerc-Madlala 2004; Selikow et al 2002).
The interviews yielded some widely reported reasons for Zuma’s popularity that included his ability to “deliver” services and his Zuluness. What is important to recognize, however, is that much of what can be termed his left-wing credentials were embroiled in gendered understandings of the man himself. For instance, the first answer by the group of three women to the question “why do so many people support Zuma” was: “I think that people like him because he is isoka, he has money, he is chosen by women”. Isoka is broadly a man with many girlfriends, a kind of “stud” (Hunter 2005a). In this and other interviews it was used to stress Zuma’s ability to charm supporters. Isoka is a man who can “talk well” to make himself irresistible.

But isoka’s limits are also of relevance. Revealingly, Zuma’s image as a “stud” but an honest one who marries his girlfriends is quite different to common perceptions of Thabo Mbeki. The former President also has a reputation as a philanderer, but one who discards his girlfriends; Mbeki’s womanizing is therefore typically seen as less sincere than Zuma’s. Different perceptions about how the two conduct their intimate lives seem to echo broader comparisons between Mbeki and Zuma: the former is distant and uncaring; the latter has flaws but is down to earth and respectable at heart.

The sense that Zuma has dignity (isithunzi) and is a respectable man (uhlonephekile) was apparent in other conversations. Given the many critical reports in the media about Zuma’s masculinity, I asked whether Zuma could be thought of as isoka lamanyala. Amanyala means dirt and so this term means roughly a stud who goes too far. Although being isoka lamanyala can be celebrated, it is also a derogatory term that implies that a man has lost control and dignity. The answer among virtually all of the informants with whom I spoke was a resounding “No!” Instead, they said that Zuma was a real isoka because he supported all of his wives and children.

In considering Zuma’s undoubted class appeal we must therefore recognize how this is gendered. Importantly, for a young man being poor invariably means not being married and, sometimes, even unable to attract girlfriends. Zuma’s pro-poor credentials imply that he might be able to restore men’s dignity in the domestic as well as the economic sphere.

For young women, being poor is also closely associated with being unmarried and therefore, to some extent, a perpetual girl. For such women, Zuma can appear as a respectable man who supports his wives and children. Indeed, relationships whereby young women have older, better-off boyfriends are relatively common in the area (Hunter 2002). Capturing the sense that Zuma himself is a respectable older man, an unmarried woman in her twenties who had six children interjected at one point during an interview, to the laughter of everyone in the room: “If Zuma can come and propose I will just leave my boyfriend!”
The gendered nature of class plays out in questions around childbirth too. Several people attributed Zuma’s appeal to the fact that he had many children whereas Mbeki has none. As a father, they said, the leader could relate well to the problems of ordinary South Africans. Relevant here is how poor men today are able to fulfill the biological act of fathering but often not the social role of fatherhood (Hunter 2005b). Many young men today do not have the ability to support their children; though men are often criticized for deserting their children, they can experience this abandonment, in part, as emasculating. In turn, for young women, Zuma is a symbol of respectability because, unlike younger men, he supports his many children.

One way Zuma’s familial credentials were admonished by female informants—again showing how class is gendered—was when they said that Zuma would increase the child support grant. The ANC government introduced the payment for guardians of children under seven years old at first, but later extended it to include children under 14 and then 15 years old. The child support grant’s value increased over time and, along with the state pension, it became one of the most important ways of addressing poverty in the country. The payment’s very nickname, imali yeqolo (money of the back), gives a sense of the everyday contestations around gender. The women I spoke with said that the name derived from a pregnant woman’s back pain. However, another more masculine explanation for the term is that a woman hurts her back while engaging in sex to conceive babies.14

Speaking positively about Zuma’s respect for the patriarchal family, one theme mentioned by the group of young men I spoke with was his opposition to same-sex marriages and new abortion laws. Many South Africans are suspicious of new legislation rooted in liberal ideas of individual rights, an approach associated with the modernist Mbeki: “It’s Mbeki that made that law so that people of the same sex can marry . . . and that children even of 12 years can have an abortion . . .”.

However, it must be noted that these three young men said that they were not opposed to all same-sex sexual relations, principally marriage between two men or two women. Although violence against men and women in same-sex relations appears to have increased in recent years, there have long been accounts of men living on mines engaged in same-sex sexual relations and still supporting a marital home (Moodie 1994; for an important criticism of Moodie for ignoring same-sex pleasure see Epprecht 2004). The complex entanglements of desire, material support, kinship, and identity are beyond the scope of this paper. I certainly do not want to suggest that violence against non-normative sexualities is anything but pervasive. Yet the comments suggest the need for a deeper understanding of Zuma and his supporters’ homophobia.

Tellingly, all informants told me that both men and women liked Zuma in equal numbers. A few said that young people favored him.
more than older people, although his support generally crossed age. One reason for his slightly lesser support among older people was that the Zulu nationalist Inkatha party tended to be quite popular with this group; some residents in the area had a loyalty to Inkatha going back three decades (Inkatha’s continued, if reduced, support in KwaZulu-Natal was one reason why Zuma did better electorally in most other provinces).

Taken together, the above comments suggest that Zuma speaks for—indeed embodies—not only the dire need for job creation and a critique of growing inequalities but highly personal aspects of social reproduction, from marriage to supporting children. Zuma’s perceived closeness to everyday problems, often personal ones, was expressed in the phrase unozwelo (he has sympathy). And being a man of the people connects Zuma to the dreams of the anti-apartheid movement in important ways. As Gunner (2009:43) argues, Umshini Wami (machine gun), Zuma’s signature song, “articulated a deep need to return and create the just state . . . a struggle song can have the ability to collapse time”. Indeed, the “better life for all” that the ANC promised in its 1994 election campaign was as vague as it was all-encompassing, signifying improvements in all spheres, from the economic to the personal.

It is precisely Zuma’s ability to talk to society’s tremendous economic and personal upheavals, then, that allowed him partly to transcend generation, ethnicity, and gender. For the young, he brought hope of work, service delivery, and a re-mooring of gender relations now in turmoil; for the old, he could also stand for a renewed sense of generational respect. If many South Africans felt a strong sense of betrayal towards their political leaders, Zuma somehow stood inside and outside government: he connected in new ways (and quite contrary to the famous feminist slogan) the personal and the political. Specifically, Zuma embodied a vision of an active state that is both modern/democratic, having abolished apartheid, but also incorporative of a past (somewhat imagined) world where young men and women were more respectful of gendered and generational hierarchies—and when the young enjoyed more economic prospects and domestic respect. These are not abstract, disembodied, meanings. When township residents today walk daily past four-room “matchbox” houses they evoke—indeed live—the era of male work and marriage.

Yet masculinities are constantly in flux, as much rich work in South Africa has now shown (see Morrell 1998, 2001). Zuma’s warrior-like image, evoked by his signature song Umshini Wami, can coexist with—but also be challenged by—alternative ideas of manhood. And some readings of Zuma, as we have seen, call on notions of respectability that are linked in powerful material and emotional ways to work and marriage. In fact, men’s groups, which have formed quite quickly after apartheid to challenge gendered violence, actually draw from
long-standing associations between manhood and respectability to which Zuma also talks (on respectable masculinities see Robins 2008b). Even critical statements by Zuma’s most virulent male opponents then can ironically be taken as evidence that Zuma’s gender views should not be dismissed as simply backward, or “Neanderthal”.

Conclusion: The Gendered Politics of Social Reproduction

Townships, the spaces considered here, housed only a proportion of South Africans. Segregationist laws meant that tens of thousands of people were brutally removed from cities to rural areas. Yet while the research for this article took place in a predominantly urban settlement, I believe that my arguments hold up well in more rural settings.15 If the state built “family” houses in urban townships to promote the male-led household, writers have long argued that rural areas fostered an “accommodation of patriarchs” between white men and African chiefs/household heads (Guy 1997). Moreover, while I noted the recent rise of urban unemployment, from relatively early on in the twentieth century most rural areas failed to support their populations (this, in fact, formed a central part of Wolpe’s 1972 argument noted earlier). Finally, marital rates are very low across the country as a consequence of both urban and rural poverty (Hunter 2010). In sum, at one level of abstraction, race, gender, class, and age are tied together in somewhat similar ways across South Africa.

If we talk of a “crisis of social reproduction” in South Africa today, then we must recognize the importance of recent transformations to intimacy. To be poor in South Africa is, to a large degree, to be unmarried. Indeed, the gender contestations that are widely reported in the country are closely related to the virtual ending of a patriarchal bargain based on male work—or an alternative arrangement based on women’s economic independence. And race is entangled with these processes in ways that attract surprisingly little attention. The current period of chronic unemployment reworked South Africa’s racialized/gendered history in important ways in the personal spheres: 59% of the white population is married whereas this figure is almost half (30%) for Africans (Republic of South Africa 2004:61, 31). Although there is much truth in the statement that apartheid divided families, rising unemployment from the 1970s is probably a more significant cause of declining marital rates.

Will Zuma meet the hopes of his supporters? While embracing rhetorically poor black South Africans, Zuma says that his economic policies will not differ significantly from Mbeki’s. “Development” for Zuma, like Mbeki, is a largely technical affair, “delivering” services rather than driving deeper structural changes to society. If this remains the case and Zuma’s popularity flags—and a spate of “service-delivery
protests” beginning in July 2009 suggested a very short post-election honeymoon—how will Zuma justify a political transition whose main beneficiaries are a multi-racial middle class? One of the ways that Mbeki dealt with the contradictions of post-apartheid inequalities was constantly to portray race as the single dividing line in the country (MacDonald 2006). It is likely that a Zuma government will shift this approach—and this will necessitate understanding the politics of gender and social reproduction in critical new ways.

Postscript
After this article was accepted for publication (November 2009), the Zuma administration’s gloss continued to fade. At the time of writing (October 2010), Zuma has just survived a crippling public sector strike followed by an antagonistic National General Council meeting in which some delegates questioned his leadership. But debates do not only center on whether he betrayed the left, who brought him to power. In early 2010 it came to light that he had fathered a child out of wedlock with the 39-year-old daughter of a prominent soccer administrator. Facing sustained criticism, he was forced to apologize. As events surrounding his child show, gender inflects these political currents in ways that demand critical attention.

Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Linzi Manicom and the University of Toronto’s Political Spaces writing exchange group, especially Deb Cowen, for comments on a much earlier version of this paper. For suggestions on later drafts, I thank Gillian Hart, Atiqa Hachimi, Robert Morrell, Melanie Samson, and the TAP (Tradition, Authority, and Power) research group based at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Finally, I thank the journal’s reviewers for critical comments.

Endnotes
1 There are, of course, multifarious feminist voices in South Africa and I do not want to suggest that there is a united feminist opinion on Zuma. However, relevant to Zuma’s reception and the points raised in this article, Hassim (2006) argues that the women’s movement had much more success in enshrining formal rights than redistributive measures at the time of democraticization. Moreover, Manicom (2005:32) provides an important critique of how dominant feminist thinking on citizenship became “rendered in the grammar of liberal democracy...”. Another relevant context is the large external funding for gender work in poorer countries like South Africa, a trend critiqued by Mama (2004:121) as “gender technocrats touting a new kind of export product”.
2 At the time of Zuma’s rape trial thousands of women wrote positive comments on the “Friends of Zuma” website. See http://www.friendsofjz.co.za (last accessed 10 January 2007). Demonstrating Zuma’s support in urban as well as rural areas, roughly as many women as men indicated their approval of the leader in a survey conducted in Soweto township. The survey was reported by Terreblanche (2007).
3 On declining voter registration in previous elections see Schulz-Herzenberg (2007). It should be noted that the ANC’s share of the popular vote in 2009
was slightly lower (66%) than in the 2004 election (70%) and roughly the same as in the 1999 election. This sustained level of support, nevertheless, surprised many, since it came on the back of the formation of a breakaway party (COPE) and corruption charges against Zuma that were dropped only days before the election. On youth’s enthusiasm for registering see “Final Voter Registration in Feb”, News24.com, http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Politics/0,,2-7-12_2457678,00.html (last accessed 12 June 2009).

4 I use the lowercase for colored and white to reflect their social construction but uppercase for African and Indian since, although socially constructed, the words are derived from geographical places. I use scare quotes conservatively to improve the article’s readability.

5 The most detailed description of Zuma’s political rise is given by Gordin (2008). The only account I have found that raises issues somewhat similar to the ones I do here is a newspaper article written by Steinberg (2009).

6 Only 6.8 million people today are in full-time work, around 3.1 million are in outsourced work, 2.2 million are in informal work, and 8.4 million are unemployed (Von Holdt and Webster 2005:28).

7 Critical research on ethnicity in the 1980s often showed how hardened ethnic boundaries were politically produced. One landmark text on the KwaZulu-Natal region is Mare and Hamilton (1987).


9 Imijondolo’s singular is umjondolo. This word is often translated as “shack” but can also mean “one-room rented residence” in the Mandeni area. This is because many imijondolo in the area are constructed using concrete blocks and most are rented.

10 According to census figures, the number of African married people aged over 15 years was as follows: 1936—56%; 1951—54%; 1960—57%; 1970—49%; 1980—42%; 1991—38%; 2001—30% (author’s calculation from various census reports, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria).

11 A song performed by Kwaito star Arthur and banned by the national broadcaster (Arthur, Sika Lekhekhe, EMI, 2005, 6009509316074).


13 We had found from previous research that young people could often talk more freely in groups, whereas older people preferred us to visit their homes and interview them alone.

14 Thanks to Jason Hickel for alerting me to the second meaning.

15 In reality what constitutes an urban or rural area is a matter of great debate. Residents of bigger towns can, for instance, position Mandeni as “rural” since it consists of residential areas and factories surrounded by rural land. Much more could be said about how geography differentiates, and helps to constitute, Zuma’s support; nevertheless, for the purposes of this short paper I do not take these points further.

References


Beneath the “Zunami”


Meillassoux C (1972) From reproduction to production: a Marxist approach to economic anthropology. Economy and Society 1:93–103
Robinson V, Tabane R and Haffajee F (2006) 23 days that shook our world. Mail and Guardian, 28 April, 6
Tolisi N (2009) A teenage idol. Mail & Guardian, 6 March